Is ‘trouble’ President Petro’s game plan? Let’s model that

Why modeling this

Back in April 2022, when Gustavo Petro was the frontrunner for the Colombian presidential election, I described a dilemma he would face as a left-wing President. He could either radicalize or compromise. Compromising would mean being able to accomplish objectives, while giving up on some of his beliefs. Radicalizing would mean sticking to those beliefs while renouncing the possibility of concrete accomplishments. This under the assumption that in Colombia, a big, complex and complicated country, it’s almost impossible to accomplish policy goals without some measure of compromise. 

Today, it seems clear that he first compromised and then radicalized. Compromising did pay off: not only he won the election, he was also able to pass ambitious legislation during his first congressional term (from his inauguration in August 2022 to December 2022). What caused his turn towards radicalization would be a much bigger inquiry (my own theory points to a deep personal urge); what matters is that he did, and that it seems irreversible. 

Ever since he took his radical turn, a sensible hypothesis has been that he is in fact seeking trouble, and that trouble is in some way his game plan. Let’s define, examine and model that hypothesis. 

The trouble hypothesis

As a general statement the hypothesis goes like this: having renounced the possibility of accomplishing goals by way of compromise and moderation, President Petro will seek to accomplish those goals (or others) by deliberately causing trouble (what kind of trouble, how and when, create different versions of the hypothesis). 

In principle, the hypothesis has two variants, let’s call them policy trouble and structural reform trouble. 

‘Policy trouble’

A general statement for the policy trouble hypothesis would be something like this: in a number of areas in which the Executive has significant autonomous powers, the President will deliberately cause trouble, or let trouble be caused, in order to either make the case for radical reform in those areas, or actually using his power to make reforms. 

Prominent cases are energy, security and healthcare. Take the case of energy: pre-existing problems add to the El Niño forecasts to raise warnings of crisis and even power rationing. Experts claim the Executive is failing to use its powers to solve the problem. At the same time, both the President and the Energy Minister are very active in denouncing what they consider to be a “neoliberal” structure of the sector. The game plan, under that hypothesis, would seem apparent: using the fear of an impending crisis, or maybe the crisis itself, to drastically reform the sector, seeking much higher government participation (perhaps ownership). 

In the cases of security and healthcare, failure to act would seem targeted at allowing crisis factors to grow, in order to prove political points and maybe push for specific reforms. 

A simple model for this strategy would look like this: 

‘Structural reform trouble’

It gets more complicated here. Think of it this way: Whether it’s a Plan A or a Plan B, the strategy would be to claim that the failure of President Petro’s reforms (either in Congress or in judicial review) proves that the establishment is blocking change. From that point, a number of variants follow. 

Let’s call the first one the self-victimization scenario, in which the President moves on to make this claim over and over in social media, rallies, speeches and interviews. And that’s it. No revolution follows. Let’s model this:

Second, there is the revolutionary scenario. Just to make clear: this doesn’t involve violence or things like an overthrow of the government. It’s more subtle. Think of it this way: after years of failures, the President would move on to claim that change is being systematically blocked by entrenched powers, which have a hold on institutions like Congres and the courts. He could then claim that the only way to make those changes is some kind of massive mobilization, which would either put pressure on the institutions to give in, or would seek some kind of subtle extra-institutional action. Keep in mind that constitutional reform would fall in the first sub-variant (pressuring institutions), as it requires significant institutional involvement whatever the mechanism (a constitutional assembly, a referendum, reform by Congress). 

It’s not clear what the second sub-variant (subtle extra-institutional reform) would exactly be. Probably some kind of massive popular movement, a kind of Colombian spring, which would demand something like a people’s constitutional assembly transcending current legal constraints. 

Let’s model: 

Keep in mind that the revolutionary scenario is a huge gamble which could easily go wrong, and catastrophically so. That’s why, in that case, the odds are as important as the payoff/costs framework. And my view as of today is that the odds will be very low when the time comes for this to be activated. 

So, what will it be?

President Petro’s choice of game plan will depend on his own set of incentives and constraints. I list a simple set below, make your own calculation!

Incentives: 

• Being seen not just as an ordinary president but as a historic, transformational figure.
• Being seen as a major intellectual. 
• A strong disposition towards rhetoric instead of action.
• Strongly stimulated by confrontation.

Constraints:

• Poor executive and team-leadership abilities.
• A preference for rhetoric instead of action.
• Low and probably diminishing political capital.
• A strong checks and balances system, including an intensely critical public opinion.

See you in a couple of weeks.