PALESTINIAN OFFICERS ACADEMY- (POA)

As many readers will be aware Israel gained its independence in 1948. In those turbulent and violent times, many Palestinians were forcibly removed from their homes and the problems began. For a period of over 60 or more years Arab nations supported the establishment of the Palestinian State by means of outright conflict and war, but all to no avail. Even though Palestine today has declared itself to be a state, it lacks full international recognition.

And so today modern Palestine is in two parts: the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Whilst the Palestinian Authority, an unelected governing body, administers the West Bank its influence in the Gaza Strip is tenuous. However, within the West Bank the Palestinian Security Forces (PASF) attempt, and with moderate success, to maintain some form of law and order within their limited jurisdiction, limited of course by the Israelis. The West Bank is not a complete entity; it is divided into 3 non-contiguous elements: Areas A, B, and C dotted throughout the West Bank. For example, Ramallah in which I lived and worked for 5 years sits in Area A. In Areas A the Palestinian Authority has the responsibility for security and civil administration but in Areas B the PA has security responsibility and the Israeli authorities control civil administration. In Areas C, Israel has the responsibility for both security and civil administration. 60% of the West Bank is Area C and is the most productive. Like all other aspects of government, the enforcement of law and order is not straightforward in this highly charged, complex and volatile environment.

The Palestinian Security Forces perform their overt security functions moderately successfully when measured against UK standards. I say overt, as there is considerable intelligence liaison between the Israeli and Palestinian Security Forces.  Not only do the PASF have to look outwards to their immediate neighbours they have monitor and act against their own internal threats to safety and security. Those threats manifest themselves in the form of armed political activists, armed criminals and not least family disputes. My first experience of a family dispute was an hour long pitched gun battle between two families in Qalandiya (a non-mans land suburb of Jerusalem with neither constant Israeli or Palestinian police presence) with up to 20 individuals firing AK 47s across the street.

The more far-sighted senior officers within the PASF acknowledge the poor standards of training within their forces and have taken steps off their own initiative to remedy the problems of leadership at the Young Officer level. To that end, I was selected by an international development company on behalf of the UK Ministry of Defence to join the Ramallah based UK team in order to write a Junior Officer Leadership Course (JLC). In developing this 6 week long course jointly with my Palestinian colleagues, I gained some insights in to how they lived, worked and coped with the significant restrictions imposed on them by the Israeli military authorities. For example, to leave and enter the West Bank I had to pass through Israeli military checkpoints which open and close at will. For Palestinians to leave the West Bank to go into Israel for a day at the beach they have to apply for permission which is rarely given.

In writing and developing the JLC I failed to convince my Palestinian counterpart of the need for this course to be as practical and exercise driven, as time would allow. This approach was in stark contrast to the Palestinian ideas of leadership training. Leadership was deemed to be education and education takes place in the classroom. Of the 6-week course 5 were classroom based with only 3 days allocated to outdoor recces to support a map exercise. Nevertheless and as a poor alternative, I convinced the staff to demonstrate leadership through film. I chose Master and Commander (Russel Crowe and with Arabic sub-titles) as a way in which to show leadership principles that had been discussed in the classroom. Even though the illustration of these principles in the workplace were in a naval setting, they nevertheless explained the leadership skills that we were talking about. And it worked although my original choice of film (Invictus – where Nelson Mandela unites apartheid torn South Africa through the medium of international rugby) was rejected, as there were too many parallels to the existing Israeli Palestinian situation.

I should add that the development of the JLC was as a natural consequence of the hard work of all my predecessors who had started the process of support to the PASF in 2008. The British Support Team based in Ramallah was and remains to this day, a part of the United States Security Coordinator’s (USSC) organization based in Jerusalem. Under the aegis of the US State Department and working from the US Consulate in Jerusalem, this small multinational HQ is tasked through the three star general to support the professional improvements of the PASF in terms of infrastructure, equipment and training, but without jeopardizing Israeli security. In support of the USSC there are two main contingents at one star level– Canadian and British with other nations represented (Germany, Netherlands, Greece, Finland). On arrival in 2008 the British contingent perceptively analysed the PASF situation and determined that leadership training was the key to success. The team jointly with Palestinian colleagues developed a Senior Leaders Course (SLC – Colonel / Brigadier rank) aimed at teaching and discussing strategic issues associated with the complexities of the Middle East in general and Palestine in particular. The success of this course led to the creation and delivery of the Intermediate Leaders Course (ILC) at the tactical level up to and including battalion level tactics. Over time, both courses have been handed over to Palestinian staff and instructors who deliver the material with only minimal administrative and mentoring support from the British Support Team.

The senior Palestinian general in charge of overall training of the PASF approached the British Support Team in 2013 with the request to establish a Palestinian Officers Academy based on Sandhurst. Having been the SO 1 Training at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, been the author of the JLC, speaking Arabic and understanding the culture, I was selected to run the project. With no staff, no budget, no agreed location I was handed a blank sheet of paper and directed to set up a practical outdoor officers leadership course for 100 students for 9 months with an overseas live firing 4 week culminating exercise in Jordan based on Sandhurst. What could be easier!

Amongst the lack of resources at the beginning, the most taxing issue was that of Israeli acceptance of the project and their tacit approval. Having assured the Israeli defence establishment that the practical outdoor tactical exercises will be based on current Palestinian security operations – in essence gendarmerie operations and limited to rifles and pistols only (as the Palestinians are not allowed to have any heavy weapons) – approval was given provided that no sniper training was involved!

I had the good fortune to be supported by some excellent international staff – a highly competent Greek Police Captain and an equally capable German Federal Police Superintendent. Over time the international staff increased and with excellent curriculum development work coming from within the British Support Team when their mentoring tasks of the SLC, ILC, and JLC allowed.

As you might imagine it was not the easiest of tasks to approach the USSC HQ with the request for them to fund an essentially British centric project based on UK’s leadership doctrine, but with a US budget. Despite considerable initial misgivings and protestations a multi- million-dollar budget was released.

Whilst battling on the international front for money and staff an added complication was to convince some doubters amongst the Palestinian security hierarchy of the western leadership principles and how to train for them. It should be remembered that senior Palestinian officers gained their positions related to their allegiance to Yasser Arafat and their commitment to Palestinian nationalism. A Palestinian colleague was promoted to Major for taking a bullet to the shoulder in the defence of Yasser Araft’s HQ when the Israelis surrounded it. Senior officer training had been conducted over the years in what we would regard as Soviet bloc countries: Yemen, Algeria, Russia and China. Consequently the prevailing views of command and leadership were that of centralized control with no understanding of mission command and delegated authority. It was not unusual to see a Major General sign off a vehicle request, which would be done at Corporal level with the British Army system

Decision-making was a minefield as was the acceptance of responsibility for the outcomes of that decision. Such fundamental issues which support the effectiveness of an armed force needed to be unlearned and reapplied in a more modern and easily understood way. My colleagues addressed this critical issue by designing “command tasks” based on the Army Selection Board at Westbury adapted to local circumstances. In this way the leadership principles upon which the entire course was based were explained and practiced often with stunned amusement by the students “ But we do not have crocodile filled rivers here in Palestine!”

And finally over a period of 3 years we developed a 9 month long curriculum jointly with our Palestinian colleagues who in fairness to them were developing lesson plans on topics which nobody had ever taught them in the past. It was as much a learning exercise for them as well as the students. The generosity of the US budget allowed us to adapt existing buildings and classrooms in the PASF camp in Jericho and support the training with a full computer suite with Internet linkage. But the most important part of the development of the course was to convince the Palestinians that leadership can be developed through education (classroom based) but more importantly could be trained and exercised outdoors. To that end we developed some demanding exercises based on PASF operations, which included VIP protection; roadblocks; searches of cars, individuals and locations and raids into Palestinian refugee camps, which have proven to be highly dangerous and demanding operation. Refugee camps (displaced Palestinian families from the 1948 War of Independence) are lawless sanctuaries for criminals and armed political activists. During the exercises students are given command appointments and their performance graded with lessons learned both tactically and particularly from a leadership perspective.

Whilst the creation of a Palestinian Officers Academy is in itself a significant step forward in developing the leadership qualities amongst the officer cadre, it will not take effect immediately. At worst it could take a generation but on a more optimistic note, I hope that when the newly trained young officer reaches a position of influence and authority he may draw back on his experiences at the POA and be prepared to introduce new leadership ideas. The longer-term aim is the same as with the development of the other leadership courses namely to pass control to the Palestinians to run the Academy with minimal international / British mentoring presence.

Politics and religion apart, I strongly recommend a visit to both Israel and Palestine. Individual security incidents reflected in the press paint a distorted picture of a beautiful part of the world, rich in history and culture with a marvelous climate for 9 months of the year.

From a purely military history perspective, there is much to see and many battlefields to be visited. Should you be interested in such battlefield tours (which I run for the UK Ministry of Defence) then please make contact – anthonymalkin@yahoo.co.uk