Major CIA Operation Based in Hawaii

The following are excerpts from the book, Explosive Secrets of Covert CIA Companies, authored by Captain Rodney Stich, one of over 20 books in the Defrauding America book series.

Major Pacific CIA Operation: BBRDW

After Nugan Hand’s cover was blown and the operation abandoned, the CIA redirected many of the Nugan Hand operations to another Pacific financial institution in Hawaii-based Bishop, Baldwin, Rewald, Dillingham and Wong (BBRDW). This CIA proprietary was started, operated, and funded by the CIA in 1979, using many of the same high-level people that had staffed Nugan Hand Bank.

By the end of 1980, BBRDW began setting up offices in Hong Kong, Taiwan, Indonesia, Singapore, and Australia, all former Nugan Hand locations, staffing the offices with over 30 CIA agents, including some of the same high-level people that operated Nugan Hand Bank. Gen. Edwin Black; Gen. Leroy Manor; Adm. Lloyd Vasey; Adm. Earl Yates; Walter McDonald; Maurice Houghton. As in most CIA-related proprietaries, its key management was comprised of CIA-related personnel.[1]

The CIA used BBRDW as an international investment company cover, with 120 employees staffing offices in sixteen countries, including Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Taiwan, New Zealand, Singapore, London, Paris, Stockholm, Brazil and Chile. CIA personnel opened and operated these far-flung offices.

For appearances, the CIA placed in charge of its BBRDW proprietary a Honolulu businessman, Ronald Rewald, who had worked for the CIA years earlier while attending Milwaukee Institute of Technology. That CIA college project was called Operation MH Chaos, and consisted of spying on student groups during the mid-1960s. The CIA gave Rewald the alias WINTERDOG. Other CIA divisions had parallel programs called Operation Mother Goose and Operation Back Draft.

Rewald left the CIA after college, married, and had five children, and lived comfortably in a home on Lake Michigan. Business changes caused Rewald to move his family to Hawaii, where he opened an investment consulting company under the name Consolidated Mutual Investment Corporation (CMI). It was here in 1978 that the CIA lured Rewald back into the Agency and used his company as a cover.

The Agency felt that Rewald‘s athletic activities could snare dignitaries from foreign counties, and encouraged Rewald to become active in polo and other high-profile activities at which these dignitaries were hosted. Rewald became an international polo player, later using BBRDW to purchase the Hawaii Polo Club, which enabled him to cultivate friendships with many influential people throughout the world. These included the Sultan of Brunei, who later transferred seven billion dollars from British banks to U.S. banks. The CIA wanted Rewald to maintain a lavish life style to attract these people, and funded these activities through other covert companies, especially law firms and consulting firms.

Signing CIA Secrecy Agreements

One of the secrecy agreements that Rewald had to sign for the CIA follows. That document, as in dozens of others, had been recopied a number of times, resulting in a document that is less easily read than the original. For that reason, the secrecy agreement, and other documents, have been retyped for ease of reading by the reader.

SECRECY AGREEMENT

1. I, Ronald Rewald, hereby agree to accept as a prior condition of my being employed in, or otherwise retained to perform services for, the Central Intelligence Agency, or for staff elements the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence (hereinafter collectively referred to as the Central Intelligence Agency), the obligations contained in this agreement.

2. I understand that in the course of my employment or other service with the Central Intelligence Agency I may be given access to information which is classified with the standards set forth in Executive Order 12065 amended or superseded, or other applicable Executive Order, and other information which, if disclosed in an unauthorized manner, would jeopardize foreign intelligence activities of the United States government. I accept that by being granted access to such information I will be placed in a position of special confidence and trust and become obligated to protect this information from unauthorized disclosure.

3. In consideration for being employed or otherwise retained to provide services to the Central Intelligence Agency I agree that I will never disclose in any form the following categories of information or materials, to any person not authorized by the Central Intelligence Agency to receive them:

a. information which is classified pursuant to Executive Order and which I have obtained during the course of my employment or other service with the Central Intelligence Agency.

b. information, or materials which reveal information, classifiable pursuant to Executive Order and obtained by me in the course of my employment or other service with the Central Intelligence Agency but which because of operational circumstance or oversight, is not formally marked as classified in accordance with such Executive Order, and which I know or have reason to know has not been publicly acknowledged by the Agency.

c. information obtained by me in the course of my employment or other service with the Central Intelligence Agency that identifies any person or organization that presently has or formerly has had a relationship with a United States foreign intelligence organization, which relationship the United States government has taken affirmative measures to conceal.

4. I understand that the burden will be upon me to learn whether information or materials within my control are considered by the Central Intelligence Agency to fit the description set forth in paragraph 3, and whom the Agency has authorized to receive it.

5. As a further condition of the special confidence and trust reposed in me by the Central Intelligence Agency, I hereby agree to submit for review by the Central Intelligence Agency all information or material including works of fiction which contain any mention of intelligence data or activities, or contain data which may be based upon information classified pursuant to Executive Order, which I contemplate disclosing publicly or which I have actually prepared for public disclosure, either during my employment or other service with the Central Intelligence Agency or at any time thereafter prior to discussing it with or showing it to anyone who is not authorized to have access to it. I further agree that I will not take any steps toward public disclosure until I have received written permission to do so from the Central Intelligence Agency.

6. I understand that the purpose of the review described in paragraph 5 is to give the Central Intelligence Agency the opportunity to determine whether the information or materials which I contemplate disclosing publicly contain any information which I have agreed not to disclose. I further understand that the Agency will act upon the materials I submit and make a response to me within a reasonable time.

7. I understand that all information or materials which I may acquire in the course of my employment or other service with the Central Intelligence Agency which fit the descriptions set out in paragraph 3 of this agreement are and will remain the property of the United States government. I agree to surrender all materials reflecting such information which may have come into my possession or for which I am responsible because of my employment or other service with the Central Intelligence Agency, upon demand by an appropriate official of the Central Intelligence Agency, or upon the conclusion of my employment or other service with the Central Intelligence Agency.

8. I agree to notify the Central Intelligence Agency immediately in the event that I am called upon by judicial or Congressional authorities to testify about, or provide information which I have agreed herein not to disclose.

9. I understand that nothing contained in this agreement prohibits me from reporting intelligence activities which I consider to be unlawful or improper directly to the Intelligence Oversight Board established by the President or to a successor body which the President may establish. I recognize that there are also established procedures for bringing such matters to the attention of the Agency’s Inspector General or to the Director of Central Intelligence. I further understand that any information which I may repeat to the Intelligence Oversight Board continues to be subject to this agreement for other purposes and that such reporting does not constitute public disclosure or declassification of that information.

10. I understand that any breach of this agreement by me may result in the Central Intelligence Agency taking administrative action against me, which can include temporary loss of pay or termination of my employment or service with the Central Intelligence Agency. I also understand that if I violate the terms of this agreement, the United States government may institute a civil proceeding to seek compensatory damages or other appropriate relief. I understand that the disclosure of information which I have agreed herein not to disclose can, in some circumstances, constitute a criminal offense.

11. I understand that the United States government may, prior to any unauthorized disclosure which is threatening me, choose to apply to any appropriate court for an order enforcing this agreement. Nothing in this agreement constitutes a waiver on the part of the United States to institute a civil or criminal proceeding for any breach of this agreement. Nothing in this agreement constitutes a waiver on my part of any possible defenses I may have in connection with civil or criminal proceedings which may be brought against me.

12. In addition to any other remedy to which the United States government may become entitled, I hereby assign to the United States government all rights, title, and interest in any and all royalties, remunerations, and emolument that have resulted or will result or may result from any divulgence, publication or revelation of information by me when carried out in breach of paragraph 5 of this agreement or which involves information prohibited from disclosure under terms of this agreement.

13. I understand and accept that, unless I am provided a written release from this agreement or any portion of it by the Director of Central Intelligence or the Director’s representative, all the conditions and obligations accepted by me in this agreement apply both during my employment or other service with the Central Intelligence Agency, and at all times thereafter.

14. I understand that the purpose of this agreement is to implement the responsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence, particularly the responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods, as specified in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended.

15. In any civil action which may be brought by the United States government for breach of this agreement I understand and agree that the law of the Commonwealth of Virginia shall govern the interpretation of this agreement.

16. Each of the numbered paragraphs and lettered subparagraphs of this agreement is severable, if a court should find any of the paragraphs or subparagraphs of this agreement to be unenforceable. I understand that all remaining provisions will continue in full force.

17. I make this agreement in good faith, and with no purpose of evasion.

___________________________

Signature

___________________________

Date

The execution of this agreement was witnessed by the undersigned, who accepted it on behalf of the Central Intelligence Agency as a prior condition of the employment or other service of the person whose signature appears above.

WITNESS AND ACCEPTANCE:

_________________________

Signature

_________________________

Printed Name

________________________ Date

Another of the periodic secrecy agreements that the CIA required Rewald to sign was the following:

SECRECY AGREEMENT

1. I acknowledge the fact that because of the confidential relationship between myself and the U.S. Government, I will be the recipient of information which, in itself, or by the implications to be drawn therefrom, will be such that its unlawful discloser or loose handling my adversely affect the interest and the security of the United States. I realize that the methods of collecting and of using this information, as well as the identity of persons involved, are as secret as the substantive information itself and, therefore, must be treated by me with an equal degree of secrecy.

2. I shall always recognize that the U.S. Government has the sole interest in all information which I or my organization may possess, compile or acquire pursuant to this understanding. No advantage or gain will be sought by me as a result of the added significance or value such information may have, due to the Government’s interest in it.

3. I solemnly pledge my word that I will never divulge, publish, nor reveal either by word, conduct, or by any other means such information or knowledge, as indicated above, unless specifically authorized to do so, by the U.S. Government.

4. Nothing in this understanding is to be taken as imposing any restriction upon the normal business practices of myself or my organization: i.e., information normally possessed by us or gathered in the regular course of business will continue to be utilized in accordance with our normal practices.

   Signature:

   H. Mason Ronald R. Rewald

   25 June 1979 CMI Investment Corporation

   Declassified by 134025

   Date 8/24/85
   

Lavish Life Style Required

Rewald‘s CIA handlers encouraged Rewald to maintain a lavish life style to attract powerful people, both within the United States and foreign dignitaries. Among the coveted U.S. people were law firms and consulting companies.

Rewald‘s prior athletic activities enabled him to socialize with visiting foreign dignitaries. Rewald become active in polo and other high-profile activities at which foreign dignitaries were hosted. Rewald became an international polo player. The covert CIA operation purchased the Hawaii Polo Club, enabling him to mingle with many influential people in Hawaii and from other countries. Among these was the Sultan of Brunei, one of the richest men in the world. This relationship caused the Sultan to transfer seven billion dollars from British to U.S. banks.

Succession of CIA Station Chiefs

Rewald had a succession of CIA station chiefs and handlers to which he reported. The first was Eugene J. Welch, who was later replaced by Jack Kindschi, and then Jack W. Rardin, all of whom coached Rewald on CIA operations.

Covert Funding for CIA Proprietaries

Part of the covert funding for BBRDW came from other CIA-related companies. Money usually came in response to fictitious bills sent by BBRDW to covert CIA companies, such as law firms and public relations firms, for work that was never done. These companies were located in California, Virginia, Hong Kong and Paris.

BBRDW was active in numerous covert CIA activities, including:

• Supplying arms to Taiwan, India, and other countries, which was unlawful under federal law, but carried out under CIA orders.

• Setting up banking and trust companies for CIA money laundering.

• Secretly acquiring Japan’s secret plans for the Japanese High Speed Surface Transport (HSST) by paying a $27,000 bribe to a Japanese businessman.

• Targeting foreign political, military and business leaders whose funds were placed in accounts alongside money obtained through clandestine CIA operations.

• Funding worldwide CIA operations, including assassinations.

• Soliciting private investors in order to appear like a legitimate international investment concern, commingling their funds with those of the CIA.

• During the Falklands War, Rewald traveled to Chile and Argentina under cover of playing polo, obtaining intelligence information for the CIA.

• Targeting foreign political, military and business leaders whose funds were placed in accounts alongside money obtained through clandestine CIA operations

  Rewald was kept uninformed about the more lurid activities carried over from the Nugan Hand operation.

  Innocence in an Area of Corrupt Activities

Although Rewald was shown as the director and chief operating officer of BBRDW, Rewald was more of a titular head, with his CIA handlers, including Welch, Kindschi and Richardson, directing the operations. Many of the details of the company’s local and foreign operations were kept from Rewald.

Initial CIA Employment While in College

The CIA initially used Rewald while Rewald was a young student at M.I.T. One morning, Rewald was called into the Dean’s office where the dean told him there was a man from the government who was very interested in meeting him. The Dean introduced him to a dark, well-dressed stranger in his early 40’s by the name of “Mr. Watson.” After introducing Rewald to Watson, the dean left the room. Watson then said:

Rewald, I work for the government. Perhaps you’ve heard of the Central Intelligence Agency? We are always looking for good men, and you came to our attention. Very highly recommended, I might add,” Watson explained in a very warm manner. From everything we’ve heard about you, I believe you’ll be interested in what I have to say.”

Watson then asked Rewald to sit down and started explaining further. These were the early days of student radicalism and Watson voiced his concern that there was a strong possibility, even probability, that many of the campus radical groups were being infiltrated by, or were instruments for foreign influence.

Rewald was unable to think of any way he might contribute to the CIA’s cause, but he agreed that Watson was right in his concerns that Communism was a serious threat to the world and America. At the very least, Rewald was honored that he had been chosen to speak with such an impressive man.

Watson asked, “You’ve heard of the S.D.S? The Weathermen?” Rewald was aware of the Students for a Democratic Society and their terrorist wing, the Weathermen. Rewald acknowledged having heard of the group on television news reports.

Watson stated, “Very dangerous to our way of life. Right here in this community. The worst of them are right up the road at the University of Wisconsin. Very dangerous.”

Watson elaborated on the responsibilities of the Central Intelligence Agency, talked about God and country, and motivated Rewald to act as a CIA asset reporting on their activities. Watson said:

Rewald, I’m going to ask you to come to Chicago and take some tests. I’m sure you can qualify for a job with the Agency. You’ll have to study, but I assure you that this could lead to an unequalled career opportunity. One that will assure your family’s security.

Felt Honored to Be With the CIA

Rewald didn’t know hardly anything about the CIA, but he felt honored to have been selected. Rewald signed a secrecy oath with the CIA and then took a battery of psychological tests, including the E.R.A., a personality-intelligence test that identifies the externalized, regulated, adaptive personality, in other words, the perfect spy.

Upon being accepted the CIA provided training to Rewald which included taking clandestine photographs, checking phone numbers, finding addresses, bank accounts and school records. He was taught how to distinguish between a real student and an agitator, how to memorize information, and to watch for the type of drugs being used, including the quantities, and especially LSD. He attended a series of briefing sessions, receiving background information on radical groups and targets; individuals already known to the Agency. He was taught how to make contact with his CIA handler and advised how he would receive cash.

CIA Code Name: Winterdog

Upon returning to the University of Wisconsin campus he was known within the CIA by the code name Winter Dog, and the CIA task, Operation MH Chaos. The University of Wisconsin at Madison was in fact, as Watson said, a hotbed of S.D.S. and Weathermen activity.

Rewald dressed and played his part, and was soon attending campus flag-burning ceremonies, marches on the administration building, confrontations in which the students pelted the security guards with rocks, and all manner of 1960’s style campus turmoil.

Watson and “Winter Dog” met regularly in nearby parks where they exchanged information and photographs. Rewald was eventually invited into the inner-sanctum of the S.D.S. where he socialized with some of the University’s most fervent radicals. Rewald watched as the S.D.S. made Molotov Cocktails.

Church Committee Investigation of CIA

In the late 1970s Senator Frank Church headed a committee investigating among other things, how the CIA went about its business. The Church committee, along with one headed by Vice-President Nelson Rockefeller unearthed two decades of CIA dirty laundry.

Among the things found by these committees was illegally intercepted mail, CIA files on thousands of American citizens, none of whom had even the remotest connection to any foreign government. CIA experi­ments with drugs on unsuspecting citizens, some resulting in death. They found a trail of attempted assassination against foreign leaders. Even though most all of this conduct was ordered by the presidents at the time, well known to their cabinet officers, as well as the attorney generals in charge, they were still viewed as outrageous conduct by the Agency, in the eyes of the public.

All of these activities were illegal spying, but met with the excuse that the felonies were in the interest of national security.”

The committees found that the CIA had established a Special Operations Group within the Agency to monitor domestic dissidents. The program was called Operation Chaos. It resulted in 13,000 files on 7,200 Americans, and included the names of over 300,000 citizens and organizat­ions. All had been accumulated as part of a domestic spying effort, exactly what the CIA was forbidden to do under their charter.

Operation Chaos, which was an attempt to investigate dissidents who may have had ties to foreign governments, was in the light of day viewed by many Americans as an effort to spy on its own citizens.

The Church committee hearings led to tighter control over covert operations. Congress established permanent intelligence committees to oversee the CIA and other intelligence agencies. For the majority of Americans, this would be the last time they would have a glimpse of what the CIA did. The only things people would hear about in the future would be the agency’s failures, and there was a credo the spy Agency adopted; “Our failures are publicized, out successes are not.”

Rewald was startled by newspaper reports concerning CIA spying on campus, one of which was titled, “Campus Spying By CIA Was Illegal.” Included in that article was Rewald’s name: “Ronald Rewald, one of two spies at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, is one of the many named in an illegal spy network launched by the CIA. . . .” Rewald didn’t know that the CIA operation was illegal under U.S. laws.

Initial Meeting with CIA Chief of Station

Rewald‘s first meeting with the Honolulu CIA Station chief Eugene J. Welch was at a business lunch at a Honolulu restaurant on April 30, 1978. It concluded with Rewald not being particularly impressed with the CIA’s chief of station in Hawaii. Welch’s job was to interview and appraise potential agents and assets in the Pacific and Far East.

Welch, in his sixties, with thin graying hair, seemed stressed out as they talked. When finishing their dessert and as Rewald was sipping a Pepsi, Welch leaned back in his chair and intently studied the younger man.

“Well, Mr. Rewald,” he said, finally, “I think we should pursue this conversation again in the near future. I think you have the potential that could work out for both of us. We need to get to know each other better. Maybe you and your wife could join me and my wife for dinner, say on Wednesday?”

In his report to the CIA regarding his initial meeting, Welch said, “Rewald claims a past association with the Agency during his student days in the 1960’s when one element was attempting to trace the foreign roots of student unrest in the U.S. He shows promise of developing into a productive source of FI (foreign intelligence), once he has been oriented properly as to the Agency’s real needs and interests.”

Rewald subsequently underwent two lie detector tests, extensive training and was ultimately hired by the Agency. The CIA provided his provisional security clearance in June 1978.[2]

The Office of Logistics is responsible for all CIA proprietary companies. They also provide couriers for delivery of top-secret documents, to buy equipment ranging from computers to guns and ammunition. They operate the agency’s planes as well.

The Office of Security, within the Directorate of Administration, conducts background investigations on all employees, agents and contractors. They approve or disapprove clearances and administer polygraph tests. They are responsible for protecting the CIA from penetration by foreign agents.

The Office of Training and Education, and the Office of Financial Management, are under the Directorate of Administration. The Office of Training and Education trains CIA agents. It also operates Camp Peary, a semi-secret compound near Williamsburg, Virginia, used for training CIA personnel. There he would receive a refresher course, arriving on the agency’s own secret airlines. Camp Peary had its own airstrip.

A CIA agent recruits a source the same way a salesman looks for business. He is taught to take advantage of opportunities to meet the sort of person he is after. If an agent is targeting a diplomat, for instance, he might attend diplomatic functions, clubs, or events. The CIA started many diplomatic and other types of clubs just for that very purpose. When an agent locates a prospect, he has headquarters run a trace, a search of its files for information on his background.

Langley supplies a wish list of information or technology it would like to obtain. The agent is left to figure out how to do it. He must be able to think on his own, be imaginative. He can’t worry about all the lies. He is taught that it is for the public good; a necessary thing.

An agent is taught that the most important thing in intelligence is people. He learns to rely on himself. He is taught the use of disguises; sometimes no more than a wig and glasses can change your looks completely. An agent is taught that he need not worry about being tortured. He or she are told not to resist if caught, as eventually anyone will talk if tortured by an enemy. Agents are taught elaborate “dry cleaning,” such as driving into dead ends, speeding up to 70 miles per hour, then slowing to 20 miles per hour, to make sure they are not being followed.

This is how the real spies are trained. Specialists such as biologists, physicists, engineers, demolition experts, along with clerks and secretaries, are hired for work at Langley headquarters.

After becoming a part of the CIA, Rewald was given a number of light-cover Agency projects that Rewald was assigned. Rewald made two trips to China and was intensely debriefed afterwards.[3] The information Rewald supplied was given to the agency’s Directorate of Intelligence for analysis by its Asian experts.

The station chief seemed pleased with the results. Rewald and Welch saw each other often after the initial interview, both on Company business and socially, with wives joining their husbands for dinner at the home of one or the other.

One day Rewald was summoned to the Honolulu CIA office where Welch introduced him to Jack Kindschi, who would soon be taking over for Welch as Station Chief. They talked several hours, going over Rewald’s previous reports on China. Kindschi revealed that he was leaving for Washington the next morning, and suggested that they still had a lot of talking to do, so they should continue their discussion later after dinner.

Rewald had already noted that Kindschi was particularly secretive. To illustrate, it would be a full year before he would even know that Kindschi and his wife Helen, had children, although from the time of the first dinner meeting Rewald and Jack would see each other virtually two or three times every week. Rewald, Nancy and the family thought that Jack and Helen were childless, but about ten months after they had become fast friends, Helen remarked that their son had made the dean’s list and she wanted to reward him with a gift.

Helen, who attended dinner meetings with Jack regularly after that first evening, was a short, thin, red-haired woman 15 years older than her husband. Kindschi was also from Wisconsin and had graduated from the Madison campus where Rewald had worked on his first job with the CIA.

The Kindschi‘s were extraordinarily genial and warm; yet Jack could change in an instant to something very hard, cold and calculating—a CIA operative through and through. The Rewald children loved the Kindschi’s and in turn Jack and Helen spent a lot of time admiring the Rewald youngsters.

Kindschi assured CIA headquarters at Langley that Rewald was not motivated by money, but that he seemed to have a natural abhorrence and adversity toward communism and hostile ideologies that posed any threat to the United States. Nevertheless, the veteran CIA case officer, who had twice experienced the horror of blown covers, but had lived to tell about it, began to treat Rewald as his protégé.[4]

Having Kindschi on his side was a major plus for Rewald. The crusty Russian expert, who had been stationed in Moscow, was famous within the Agency for actually kidnapping a defecting KGB agent and spiriting him away to Mexico City where he personally debriefed the Soviet agent for six months because he didn’t trust anyone in Langley at that time. Ironically, the legend inscribed over the entrance to CIA headquarters at Langley reads: “The Truth Shall Set You Free.” The contradiction to that slogan is that the CIA routinely deals in deception and secrecy.

Rewald was offered the job of running a firm called H & H Enterprises, an existing CIA light cover operation for CIA agents Charles Hobbs and Carlton Haines, who both worked in Red China.[5] Rewald would serve as their office manager in Honolulu. Later, Canadian Far East Trade Corporation took its place.[6] Rewald’s code name would now be “LP Burger.”

This operation was under the Directorate of Operations, which also contained the Covert Action Staff and Special Operations. Its deputy director reported to the DCI.

A short while later, Sunny Wong was recruited to work for the Agency and during a meeting at a local restaurant with Kindschi, Rewald and Sunny offered the services of CMI as a CIA front and Kindschi quickly accepted.

The intelligence community consists of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the intelligence component of the Energy and Treasury Departments, the National Security Agency, the counter-intelligence component of the FBI, the National Reconnaissance Office, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the intelligence elements of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, and the Central Intelligence Agency, among others.

In the spy business there is a distinction between a CIA officer and an agent. An officer is a staff employee; an agent is the spy out in the field. Invariably, everyone mixes this up, calling all who work for the CIA, agents.

Most often, CIA officers and agents work under government cover, posing as State Department officers. Some pose as military officers or civilian government employees. In most cases these provide some form of diplomatic immunity and, if they are caught, they are merely declared persona non grata and expelled by foreign governments. Other agents work under commercial cover, posing as employees of private companies (non-official cover). When they are caught, they are arrested and imprisoned for spying, making their work risky.

The CIA also employs contract agents, who usually are under two year contracts with salary paid covertly. They are hired to perform specific tasks, such as paramilitary activities. They are called independent contractors, usually paid as consultants, and all sign secrecy agreements.

Unless they work under cover, employees in non-covert directorates acknowledge they work for the CIA. The CIA has four directorates. All report to the Director of Central Intelligence. The directorates are Directorate of Operations (DO); Directorate of Science and Technology (DS&T); Directorate of Intelligence (DI); Directorate of Administration (DA). Each has a deputy director. Within the directorates there are separate components with their own unique charter. The Office of Technical Services within the Directorate of Science and Technology provides lock-pickers, installs bugging devices, and makes spy equipment (including disguises, speech altering devices, paper used in secret writing).

The Office of Security, within the Directorate of Administration, sweeps CIA offices for electronic bugs. The Office of Financial Management, within the same directorate, issues paychecks, launders money for clandestine operations, and provides funding to the companies the CIA sets up for its agents. The Office of Logistics, also within Administration, arranges for overseas homes for CIA staff. It also buys weapons for use in various wars. The Directorate of Administrations provides computers, security and communications equipment for agents in the field.

The Agency has its own satellites, such as the KH-11 and KH-12, which orbit the earth at a height of 200 to 500 miles. They relay photographic images in real time. Lacrosse satellites use radar imaging to see through clouds, darkness and smoke. The Magnum and Vortex satellites intercept communications from 22,000 miles above the earth.

The Directorate of Intelligence brings the information together from all the sources, including satellites, intercepts of communication, foreign broadcasts, computer data, newspaper and scientific publications and information, plus that supplied by human spies. There is no more important source of intelligence information than spies in the field, and supporting them, placing them, and handling them is the agency’s most critical mission. It was with that in mind that Rewald was brought along to fill that covert need.

In August 1978, Rewald, Wong and Welch met in the CMI corporate office to discuss the formation of a new CIA covert operation. CMI was an investment firm for laundering money for Agency covert operations worldwide.

Wong, Chinese with a boyish face that disputed his 37 years, and Welch drank coffee, while Rewald, met to discuss a name for the new company. Welch said, “We need some good names. Solid names, like Rockefeller or DuPont.”

“Rockefeller?” Wong said, quizzically. “That’s not a Hawaiian name.”

“Like Rockefeller.” Welch glared at Wong. “Some solid names.”

“Cook might do,” Wong mused. “After all, he did discover Hawaii.”

Welch nodded his agreement, leaning forward in his chair. “And Castle. That’s another good one. Sounds good. Castle, Cook, Rewald & Wong. What do you think, Rewald?”

“There’s already a Castle & Cook investment firm in Hawaii.” Rewald replied, shaking his head negatively.

“Come on, Rewald“ Wong pleaded. “You’re going to be the chairman of this corporation. You think of a name.”

Rewald shook his head, frowning slightly, and then leaned back in his chair. “I’m sorry,” he said, “I just don’t know any old Hawaiian names.”

He reached for a phone book and thumbed through it.

“Wait a minute,” Sonny said, his eyes gleaming. “How about Dillingham? Everyone in Hawaii knows that name.”

“Good one!” Welch exclaimed. “We have a tie with them. Our old Agency office was in the Dillingham Building penthouse.”[7]

“There are a lot of Baldwins here,” Rewald noted from the phone book.

“Bingo!” Welch said. “We have an agent named Baldwin who’ll be working in this cover company. That would be perfect.”

“Baldwin,” Sonny said, thinking aloud. “I like it. Let’s find a couple more.”

“How about one of the old missionary families?” Rewald offered. “You can’t get much more established than that.”

“True,” Welch agreed, nodding his head. “Good point.”

Sunny suddenly leaned forward, snapping his fingers. “Bishop! It even sounds safe.”

“I agree,” Welch nodded, a confident smile crossing his face. “Hell, we can even set up offices on Bishop Street. Maybe even use Bishop Trust for our banking.”

“There it is then,” Sunny said, looking first at Welch and then Rewald, “Bishop, Baldwin, Rewald, Dillingham and Wong.”

“Anuenue!” Sunny said, pointing out a window. The rain had stopped and a rainbow was arching across the sky.

“Anuenue?” Rewald asked, looking at Wong.

“Yes, Anuenue,” Sunny smiled. “a rainbow; Good luck.”

At first, the firm was used only as a light cover for Far East operations. In 1979, BBRDW was incorporated, and in 1980, Rewald assumed his cover as its high-flying financial wizard chairman, fulfilling its intended purpose as an international investment firm.

In May of 1979, the Foreign Resources Division of the CIA filed a request for a cover that, among other things, was a “reputable commercial firm.” Kindschi cabled headquarters to offer the services of Rewald and CMI. On June 25, the CIA offered Rewald a contract for the use of his firm, in addition to his private services. The word wired from the clearance division at Langley was that this was “extremely sensitive and essential to the government to be carried out and Ronald Rewald was urgently needed.” In October of 1978 Rewald was granted “full covert security” approval.[8]

The Foreign Resources Division is within the Directorate of Operations, and sometimes operates within the United States. Its existence is a closely guarded secret. Foreign Resources Division maintains offices in major cities throughout the country, usually under commercial cover. Meetings are never conducted in the offices, and each CIA officer has at least three aliases used in conducting his work; one as a businessman, one as a government employee, and one as a CIA official. FR stations are known as Bases, and are located in Boston, Miami, San Francisco, Los Angeles, New York, Chicago, Seattle and Washington, D.C.

Of the CIA’s hundreds of operational officers working under commercial cover, most pose as employees of private companies (called non-official cover). Since CIA agents without diplomatic immunity can be arrested and imprisoned for spying, this work is far more risky and dangerous. While they may use their names, true affiliations are concealed. Elaborate cover stories must be devised to establish false backgrounds.

The Directorate of Administration, responsible for all funding and pay for CIA employees, also sets up financing for all CIA proprietary and dummy corporations. They are the agency’s largest directorate. The DOA sets up multiple bank accounts worldwide for the furtherance of clandestine offices, agents and operations. They launder money as well.

Rewald‘s cover in Bishop Baldwin Rewald Dillingham & Wong was designed and set up as a covert operation targeted at a number of powerful and very influential foreign political figures and potential investors. Rewald had to be established as a highly successful and politically well-connected international businessman, provided with a home, offices, cars and other trappings to carry this out, what the CIA chiefs called “A very urgent and important mission.” With this in mind Rewald became a polo player and Bishop Baldwin eventually acquired ownership of the fashionable Hawaii Polo Club. Rewald’s new code name would now be the “Chairman.”

Although BBRDW up to this point required minimal financial support, since the operation was light cover, Rewald as its public figure head, this would now change dramatically.

Up to this point, the cover costs for Bishop Baldwin were met the same as for H & H Enterprises, Canadian Far East Trade Corp., and CMI. Checks or bank transfers were made with companies or individuals that Rewald had never heard of. These transactions had been relatively modest in size, but met CIA cover requirements. Now that would change.

After two years of low-level covert support, Bishop Baldwin now needed its own bank accounts. Four were quickly established in Honolulu, California, Hong Kong and the Cayman Islands. An Investment Savings Account was established in Hawaii and Hong Kong to both meet BBRDW’s expanded financial requirements and to support its cover as a fast growing investment firm, with international capability.

The first year’s expenses were modest. Most deposits in the BBRDW bank accounts consisted of deposits from Kindschi, Richardson and a few other Agency staff, always under their names or cover names. A few legitimate investment-consulting clients would be included that first year for credibility. A couple of Rewald‘s relatives and friends, invited by Rewald to share in the higher than average return, investments selected by CIA financial experts at Langley Headquarters, to give the appearance of a successful, fast growing firm. Billings for consulting services would be sent to companies and individuals in California, Virginia, Hong Kong and Paris, even through no services were provided. The only contact that ever existed between Rewald, BBRDW and its expanded supporting consulting clients were the invoices for services and their return payments by check or wire transfer.

Rewald‘s limited staff in the first two years would have had to be cloned 12 times over to have performed all the consulting services they were paid for. Their bank accounts in Honolulu and Hong Kong swelled by the month. The first actual employee hired by Rewald and BBRDW was Richard Spiker, who had been their banker, leaving his position as head of Hawaii National Bank, Waikiki. BBRDW grew rapidly in staff, locations and prestige, along wit5h money to meet the expanding Rewald, Bishop Baldwin, CIA requirements.

Bishop Baldwin had been originally designed for use in Southeast Asia, but soon the CIA had helped establish offices in Beverly Hills as well as in Hawaii. This worried Rewald. He had seen his name in the papers regarding the allegations of spying for the CIA on college campuses. Offices in the U.S. mainland were too risky, he thought, but, on the other hand, the Agency knew what it was doing. Didn’t the CIA have the very best minds in government working for them? Who was Rewald to question?[9]

[Various documents and pictures are available only in the book.]

Ronald Rewald and CIA Station Chief Jack Kindschi

Legendary South Seas personality, Don Beach, and Ronald Rewald.

Beach was one of the first clients for CMI Investments.