John Richardson’s Post

WE NOW HAVE 32 months of trade and pricing data since the end of the 1992-2021 Chemicals Supercycle and so it is worth taking stock of what the numbers are telling us - https://lnkd.in/ghdmzaCY. And as we have 32 months of information to draw on since the end of the Supercycle, which is from January 2022 until August 2024, it is worth making like-for-like comparisons with the 32-month period immediately before the end of the Supercycle - May 2019 until December 2021. Focusing just on polypropylene (PP) with the story the same in many other products: · South Korea and Taiwan saw declines in PP sales turnover in China of $1.1bn and $694m respectively when this two 3-month periods are compared. Despite its feedstock advantages, Saudi Arabia saw its turnover fall by $681m followed by Singapore at $633m and Thailand at $613m. · Losses across China’s top ten trading partners totalled $4.6bn. The only winner was, not surprisingly, the Russian Federation with a turnover gain of $102m. Another symptom of a chronically oversupplied market has been a collapse in margins as another chart in today’s post illustrates: · In May 2019-December, the average of both naphtha and PDH-based PP margins was $281/tonne, but this fell to just $12/tonne in January 2022-September 2024. And this latter period has involved many weeks of negative margins. A pivotal turning point in global chemicals markets, the most important since 1992, was the Evergrande Moment. And yet far are too few references to this essential context. China’s debts and its demographics told us from as early as 2011 that a steep fall in economic growth had to happen. We also knew from 2014 onwards, thanks to a shift in government policy, that much-greater chemicals self-sufficiency was on the way. This gave producers plenty of time to build strategies that reduced their dependence on China. But how many companies took note of what the demographic and debt trends were telling us? How many took note of the threat to China’s exports from 2018 onwards as the geopolitical environment deteriorated? My suspicion is that far too few companies were ready for the changes now well underway, which are reflected in the above demand, supply, sales turnover and margins data. This was because people chose to believe misleading nonsense about the “rise of China’s middle class” when the numbers on China’s per capita incomes, the country’s birthrate and the rise in its debts exposed the myth. The chemicals industry is science and data driven except, seemingly, in one critical area:  Macroeconomics.

LAST WEEK’S launch of a new “stimulus bazooka” by the Chinese government might lead to a rally in chemicals and polymer pricing. But so what if prices go up over the next few weeks? The price rises will be of little long-term consequence unless we see big shifts in spreads and margins in the key PE market - https://lnkd.in/gym7Cdgt. Between January 2014 and December 2021, NEA integrated variable cost naphtha-based PE margins averaged $451/tonne; from January 2022 until the third week of September this year, they averaged just $2/tonne. In late 2019/early 2020, NEA PE margins briefly turned negative as oversupply increased. But the full downturn was delayed by reduced feedstock availability and a surge in PE demand resulting from the pandemic. Then came the Evergrande Moment Average CFR China PE price spreads over CFR Japan naphtha costs are at just $280/tonne so far this year, the lowest since our price assessments began in 1993. We have seen three consecutive years of new record-low spreads. It is of course no coincidence that the three years have followed the Evergrande Moment. HDPE spreads would have to rebound by 129%, LDPE spreads by 48% and LLDPE spreads by 88% to see a return to the old market conditions. Average PE spreads would thus have to rise by 80%. Follow the ICIS PE margin and data every week to discover whether a recovery is really happening in China. My view, as you know, is that China’s economy faces deep long-term challenges resulting from the end of the real-estate bubble and an ageing population. The extent to which it can maintain its dominant role in global exports is also in question because of a much more difficult geopolitical environment. I don’t believe that any amount of likely economic stimulus in China (there are political and economic limitations on stimulus) can fully address these challenges. It is what it is. We need to get used to a Chinese chemicals market where demand growth for some products might even go negative. You may disagree. But what we can and should agree on is the story that’s been consistently told by PE spreads and margins since January 2022.

I DID THE same exercise on global ethylene markets almost exactly a year ago as I do in today's post - https://lnkd.in/gCfKDV22 This makes me wonder why there is talk of early signs of a global recovery in olefins and derivative markets. Based on the new calculations, what would it take to return global operating rates to their very healthy 1992-2023 average of 88%? Assuming global production, which is about the same as demand, stays unchanged from our base case, global capacity would have to grow by an average of around 2m tonnes a year versus our base case of 6.2m tonnes a year. This implies capacity closures elsewhere to get to the 2m tonnes a year of 2024-2030 capacity growth. Global capacity would need to grow at an average 1% per year to achieve a 2024-2030 operating rate of 88%. This would compare with the 1992-2023 average of 4%. One might argue that we have underestimated global demand given the likelihood of a loosening cycle by the Fed, perhaps a big dose of Chinese economic stimulus, and booming economies in the developing world such as India’s. But what happens in the rest of the world is of less consequence compared with events in China. Today’s second chart - showing China’s percentage shares of global demand for the major ethylene derivatives in 1992 (at the start of the Chemicals Supercycle) and by the end of this year – underlines the disproportionate role that China has come to play in driving global consumption: In 1992, from a 22% of the global population, China’s average share of global demand across these ethylene derivatives was 6%. China’s share of global demand is forecast to reach 40% from only an 18% share of the global population by the end of 2024. The Economist wrote in its 7 September issue that the real Chinese economic picture may be bleaker than is commonly painted. “The official [Chinese government] numbers show that the GDP growth rate has reverted to pre-pandemic level, despite the moribund housing industry and low investment in infrastructure,” wrote the magazine “This is a risible claim, says Logan Wright of Rhodium Group, a consulting firm. ‘The broader problem is simply that the GDP data have stopped bearing any resemblance to economic reality,’ he explains”. My ICIS colleague, Kevin Swift, has looked at disagreements over China’s population level. In the blog’s 30 August post, he wrote: “Demographer Yi Fuxian at the University of Wisconsin has questioned assumptions about current Chinese population and the likely path forward. He examined China’s demographic data and found clear and frequent discrepancies. These should parallel each other, and they do not. “Yi posits that China population in 2020 was 1.29bn, not 1.42bn, an undercount of over 130m.” If China’s population was smaller than commonly assumed in 2020, so perhaps was its chemicals demand, making today’s global oversupply worse.

THE SOUNDTRACK of my youth was the Canadian rock band, Rush. In the fabulous Tom Sawyer, the lyrics include: “His mind is not for rent, always hopeful yet discontent, he knows changes aren't permanent, but change is”. Don’t let your mind be rented by anybody who tells you that the global chemicals industry isn’t going through the most profound set of changes in its modern-day history. Nobody knows all the details of the changes that will be permanent. Anybody who claims they do know will lead you down a path away from essential scenario planning. We do know that in this world of flux and chaos at a micro level, the following macro trends are here to stay: Sustainability, ageing populations across most of the G20, much more volatile geopolitics, ever-greater economic, social and political disruptions caused by climate change and the end of debt bubbles. How will, for example, geopolitics and rising trade tensions reshape global polycarbonate trade flows, demand and trade flows? In today’s post - https://lnkd.in/gEW2t6ep, I look at scenarios for China’s net imports or net exports of polycarbonate in 2024-2030 based on levels of trade tensions and its ability to export to third-party countries such as Mexico. These countries have become a means by which China is getting around the trade tensions by relocating export-focused manufacturing plants. The ICIS base case forecasts that China’s PC demand growth will fall to an annual average of 3% in 2024-2030 from 17% in 1992-2023. Assuming this 3% demand growth, capacity growth at 4% and an operating rate of just 47% in 2024-2030 (the 1992-2023 operating rate averaged 68%), ICIS forecasts that China’s PC net imports will be around 460,000 tonnes a year. Let’s imagine in a world of increased trade tensions, China decides it cannot afford to rely on large volumes of imports. Because of the trade tensions, it also cannot export significant quantities of PC to countries such as Mexico to make autos etc. Under this outcome, let’s keep demand and capacity growth the same in the base case but raise operating rates to 55%. Average annual net imports fall to just 80,000 tonnes. What if, though, trade tensions are not that bad? If we again keep demand and capacity growth the same as the base case but raise the operating rate to 63%, China becomes a net exporter at an annual average of 460,000 tonnes between 2024 and 2030. I plan to attempt to build new demand and supply models today's demographic, geopolitical, debt, sustainability and climate change realities. This is going to be immensely difficult. Failure will be a big part of any success. But given today's events, do we have any other choice?