Hedge fund regulation -- what's next?
The Enron, Tyco and WorldCom debacles inspired Sarbanes-Oxley, which created new standards for public company boards, management and public accounting firms. Blowups at major brokerage firms inspired NASD 3012 & 3013, creating the need for compliance testing and management certification of compliance controls. Both SOX & 3012/3013 are now regular, expensive undertakings at affected companies.
We are all witness to some recent high-profile hedge fund collapses. In one case, a couple of CDO fund collapses at a major IB have drawn commentary from virtually every corner; in another, a billion $ fund collapse, attributed to timed trades in illiquid securities, inspired the defunct fund's investors to successfully sue it's Big 4 public accounting firm and to pursue legal redress from its third party administrator and possibly its prime broker.
In the recent past, the SEC tried, unsuccessfully, to force the registration of hedge funds; Goldstein et al vs. SEC prevented this. But the more recent events outlined above are likely to create a landscape favoring legislative initiatives to enhance hedge fund regulation, at least based on the recent examples indicated by SOX and the NASD, as evidenced by the ongoing efforts of lawmakers like Senator Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa), a recent recipient of NakedShorts "Moron du Jour" award (which you can read for yourself in the May 16 entry at: http://nakedshorts.typepad.com/nakedshorts/moron_du_jour/index.html ).
So while the SEC may not be able to force hedge funds to register (although the anti-fraud provisions apply whether or not a fund chooses to register), it seems that some legislative initiatives may be found to create a higher level of oversight in the hedge fund community by lawmakers, if not regulators themselves. Irrespective of source, though, it seems like will be some changes in the hedge fund regulatory climate.
What do you think are the near-term possibilities in terms for hedge fund regulation and why?
Clarification added July 30, 2007:
Some really great responses here, but Roger Pacheco's seemed to convey "next steps" with the greatest detail.
Congratulations, Roger, and thanks to you and to Maurizio, Suryanarayanan, fCh (who I now know, but whose anonymity I respect) and Jerry.
As to my own thoughts: higher standards and more disclosure seem almost certain; Grassley won't go away and he'll bring middle America with him at the first sign of a blowup that affects the common man, possibly reigniting hedge fund registration, alot more attention paid to hedge funds participating in any PIPES deals (and the Chinese Wall efforts of the IBs involved in them at any level, including trading of the public security). Rating agency compliance is still 3-5 years out, mostly because of a lack of understanding of the impact.
But what do I know? I just sold the compliance consulting service -- I didn't actually practice it.
Thanks again, gentleman, for a lively discussion. More questions coming in August.
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Roger P
President at Pacheco Consulting
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If Congress gets involved, you can be sure any regulation they will attempt to pass will be a disaster. Politicians pander to special interest groups and when Polyanna cries, they will respond with knee-jerk reactions and legislation which has no forethought.
I can envision the SEC possibly revising the definition of a Qualified Purchaser (QP) to reflect the impact of inflation on the original QP criteria. If hedge funds (HF) continue to be packaged under a HF of HF product to target clients with lower minimum requirements, then I can see the regulators stepping in and mandating more client disclosures (similar to other "suggested" regulatory disclosure documents).
I agree with Mr. Piglia that one important point missed in all this is the fact that the annointed "rating agencies" play a key part in all this. While they have n important role in the financial services industry, they do not always prove themselves to be leaders in clear disclosure and, more importantly, analysts of potential problems based on their review of the data and "kicking the tires" of the entities they cover. They are great, however, at jumping on the bandwagon and issuing negative reports after an issue has arisen. As a financial services professional, I am required to carefully review a company's/vendor's financials, management style, performance track record, underlying philosophy, experience of the portfolio managers and executive team, etc. We have to ask the tough questions and "get under the covers" initially and periodically thereafter. We must stay in tune with market conditions, economic factors, changeing regulatory environment, etc. to constantly insure our selection is correct for our clients - the investor - before it blows up and a regulator knocks on our door. It only makes sense that these Publically Recognized Statistical Rating Agencies also receive oversight - what are the credentials of these analysts, are there any conflicts of interests, what are the minimum standards of what must be reviewed and tested (and how often), etc.
Like all other financial entities and services, I believe the HF offers a viable market tool - liquidity. Just like you have speculators and hedgers in the commodities market that provide liquidity and risk taking, the HF world also provides the same important provisions. With the push for more private equity, PIPES and unique debt offerings, the HF can offer an avenue for those corporations in need to float these products to QP. The HF can provide a pool of QPs who can accept a diversied (the key here) portfolio of investments and spread this risk accordingly. Each style of HF affords a unique market component whether Equity Long/Short, Event Driven, etc. In may very well be that to offer more of a comfort level to the regulators, more transparency of holdings may be the answer. This would permit for better calculation of market exposure, leveraging and concentration that a regulator would want to monitor as part of risk management. It may well be that the regulators may/should require the clearing firms and custodians that help faciliate the trading of registered products to provide information on positions, leverage, loans, etc. provided to the HF they service. While the HF may remain unregulated (depending on how it is qualifying for an exemption from registration under the Company Act), it may make regulatory sense for them to report assets under management (as they do now under Reg D, Schedule 13 G and Schedule 13 F) on unregistered positions and leverage just so that the SEC has a heads-up on possible adverse situations. This would afford the SEC the opportunity to discuss with the HF General Partner and portfolio manager how the HF is managing exposure, contingency plans in the event of adverse market conditions, meeting any margin calls, liquidity needs, etc. A proactive risk management plan, periodic stress testing and transparency between the SEC and the HF community is the key.
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Maurizio P
Director at S&I Savings and Investments Ltd.
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Simple. Put mechanisms in place that limit the leverage you can take up and strictly link it to historical volatility of the underlying asset.
Plus put in place clear cut measurements of liquidity and liquidity risks implied in the undelying asset.
But regulating the Hedge Funds is a mistake in itself...hedge funds are, per definition, risky assets that should be left to big boys that can make calculations....and take losses.
The point is that murky CDOs have been sold directly by Banks packaging them to Pension Funds!!! Regulate Pension Funds and remove for fiduciary breeches those Pension Managers who relied only on the name and relationship of the Banks to avoid looking into them. Regulate the bloody Rating Agencies who gave AAA rating to stuff who contained also "toxic waste" i.e. subprime equity unratable by anyone.
Any Pension Manager who cannot use a Bloomberg for at least checking the % of collateral backed loans for which the borrower is 60 days or more behind should be replaced...along with any Hedge fund Manager who tought to get away holding dangerous illiquid stuff forever.
Regulate the packagers and the raters...regulating something that bears in front of any Offering Memo that investing can be dangerous and lead to big losses like Hedge Funds...is regulating the wrong target!!!!
Clarification added July 25, 2007:
Sorry, I didn't mean to be misleading...but I probably was.
The four first lines should be intended as ironic...as the first tought a legislator would have, knowing nothing in depth, therefore thinking they can dry up the ocean with a spoon.
This is a network of pros...we know, as fCh said, that a limit cannot be really in place for leverage beside the credit analysis performed by the leverage providers/lenders, that have a good reason to perform an as accurate as possible one...they could go under, lending too much to the wrong sectors.
As well, I agree that is very difficult to outlaw stupidity and greed, but incompetence should be removed. One of the primary reasons I bolted from Italy and looked to an Anglosaxon country (New Zealand) was the stupid attitude in Italy to delve in "who you know" when screening for a position, instead on "What you know and can do". I don't network for influence and position, I usually do for knowledge. period.
This is the main point. Pension Fund's managers are the persons, in this point of history, entrusted of the greatest responsibility, the welfare of a generation who worked hard to retire, and a generation that still is working hard with less and less perspectives to retire as easy as the previous.
That is why they should be extremely competent. Recently, due to the pressures of higher yelds put on Pension Funds by growing numbers of retirees, Pension Managers looked for Yeld everywhere...Wall Street put lipstick on a pig...and they fell in love and not only kissed the pig..they loved it dearly!!
Replies like the one from a New Mexico Pension Fund Manager like: "We got very interested in CDOs because a broker brought them to our attention" "We rely very much on our relationships" Man...........that's breech of trust. Send them home packing, and keep their severance pay package as partial refund for the damage.
You must KNOW inside out what you're buying, that's retirement money you're managing...in this case mismanaging!!
In 2006 a CDO called SPA blew miserably, and was packed and sold no less than from Credit Suisse. Value sold to investors in 2000: 340 MM $.
Value recoverd in 2006 : 177 MM. Final loss on principal -48%. And this happened last year...ample warning to try, for the smart ones, to quietly unwind in a casual way...No one did it, everyone kept hogloading CDOs in the portfolios. Fire those managers and their boards and replace them ...Fire them all!!! You have a just cause, breech of trust is more than enough.
And then sue to death and push Credit Rating Agencies down the Arthur Andersen path ( and that was a bit overdone i tought then ...this case will be more legitimate and justified) of running them out of the business landscape.
Rating Agencies happily fested on the fees bonanza, and it is just unconceivable you rated AAA something like that SPA stuff that just melted half the capital away...and then pull back your hands and say " All we're providing is a credit assessment and comments"
Sue them to death!!! those are your targets.
Hedge Funds....have written evrywhere they are dangerous and volatile stuff. Hedge Funds are risky stuff for big boys who can make big money but can also loose big money. You don't sue an Hedgie if you lost all your money...you blame yourself, you didn't do your homework. No Court of Law can outlaw stupidity and greed..they will always be there and alive.
The chances of any regulatory control of HFs are remote in the near-term. Why? Too many forces pulling in different directions will not let it happen.(A) You are trying to restrain the innovations in the financial market from taking shape and flying high. What is wrong with that? Evidently, the team that succeeds would like to keep their secret recipe that way - secret. Or else, why should any investor pay a premium to get a peep into them? (B) Also, I see it as unwarranted. It is a free-market. The elite investor is not a fool: he knows the risks involved. He doesn't crib when making millions. So why must he cry when he looses? (C) Regulate, if you must, by raising the entry bar for the investors; or, plugging the widespread tax evasion modes.
via F
Structuring Complexity Into Opportunity
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While I have little to add by way of answering this question, since I touched on the regulatory fallout in the eventual aftermath of a CDO debacle, I am briefly looking here at Maurizio's reply:
"Simple. Put mechanisms in place that limit the leverage you can take up and strictly link it to historical volatility of the underlying asset.
Plus put in place clear cut measurements of liquidity and liquidity risks implied in the underlying asset".
My questions are: To what "limit" should one limit leverage? AND What to do when "innovation" precedes history (as in the case of CDOs)? But of course, Maurizio knows better and suggests a fix in the money supply fueling ever growing limits of leverage--i.e. the pension fund managers themselves.
So, as sensible regulatory directions, in addition to "fixing" the rating game, I would take Maurizio's point of regulating the wannabe-turkeys in pension funds.
And, since we are at it, one should probably mention that a lot of fudge-funds (passing as hedge-funds) are mere money-conduits into funny deal-making. And this may already be the effect of too much regulation meant to outlaw stupidity.
Clarification added July 26, 2007:
Maurizio, I take you point--that also means we are having fun!
On the other hand, since you are in the business of managing pension funds yourself, I can only commend your standing against the crowd for I know how costly that is--in your case, in short term, yet high intensity, only. Molti auguri, fCh
They are already regulated. Bottom line, groups that burst took larger risks than others and lost the game. On average, somebody will always win and loose. Period. Regulation cannot change that, as it is one of the engines of most financial markets. There are heavy regulations in place that may need some minor adjustments.